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1.1 Introduction
Determining the eects of labor institutions on macroeconomic performance
is a central concern of economic policymakers. Dierences in labor insti-
tutions have been conjectured to be a key explanation for observed cross-
country dierences in the level and persistence of unemployment, in the dis-
tribution of income and wealth, and in growth rates for labor productivity
and GDP.
For example, as discussed by Blau and Kahn (1999), Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent (1998), and Nickell and Layard (1999), European OECD countries over
the past twenty years have tended to rely on administered wages and leg-
islated job protection and have experienced sluggish job growth and persis-
tently high unemployment. In contrast, the United States has had a relatively2 1 Evolution of Worker-EmployerNetworks and BehaviorsUnder Alternative Non-Employment Benets: An Agent-Based Computational Study
more 
exible, less regulated labor market and has achieved much greater job
growth and relatively lower unemployment rates. This has led many Euro-
pean policymakers to argue the need for reforms in their labor institutions.
Unfortunately, as discussed by Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Blau and
Kahn (1999), and Freeman (1998), it is dicult to obtain conclusive em-
pirical results regarding how labor institutions aect economic performance.
Regression methods relating changes in labor institutions to economic out-
comes quickly tax degrees of freedom. This problem is compounded if one
institution's impact depends on the presence or absence of other institutions.
Also, labor institutions are inherently endogenous. For example, govern-
ments continually revise labor institutions in response to economic and po-
litical pressures. This endogeneity makes it dicult to interpret the validity
of empirical investigations.
In recognition of these diculties, Freeman (1998, pp. 19-20) suggests that
agent-based computational modeling might oer a promising additional way
to study the impact of labor institutions, particularly from a market design
perspective. Tesfatsion (1998,2001,2002a) reports some preliminary work
along these lines. An agent-based computational economics (ACE) framework
is used to study path dependence, market power, and market eciency out-
comes for a labor market under systematically varied concentration and ca-
pacity conditions. ACE is the computational study of economies modeled as
evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents (Tesfatsion,2002b,2003).1
In this study we conduct an ACE labor market experiment to test the sen-
sitivity of labor market outcomes to changes in the level of a non-employment
payment. Our ultimate objective is to understand how the basic features of
real-world unemployment benet programs aect labor market performance.2
However, as will be claried below, a human subject experiment was run in
parallel to this computational experiment as a check on the reliability of our
ndings and the adequacy of the learning representations for our computa-
tional workers and employers. To facilitate this initial benchmark check, a
deliberately simplied experimental design is used.
Specically, we consider a balanced labor market with equal numbers
of workers and employers. In each trade cycle (work period), every worker
has one work oer to make and every employer has one job opening to ll.
An employer can reject a work oer received from a worker on two possible
grounds: unacceptable past work history; or capacity limitations.
1See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for extensive resources related to
ACE, including surveys, an annotated syllabus of readings, research area sites, software,
teaching materials, and pointers to individual researchers and research groups.
2For example, in the U.S., unemployment benets are nanced by taxes on employers
and are intended to provide temporary nancial assistance to workers who become unem-
ployed through no fault of their own and who continue to seek work. Understanding the
separate and combined impacts of these and other unemployment benet program features
on labor market performance over time is an extremely challenging problem. A detailed
discussion of theoretical and empirical labor market studies focusing on unemployment
benets and related issues can be found in Pingle and Tesfatsion (2001).1.1 Introduction 3
The workers repeatedly submit their work oers to preferred employers
until either they succeed in being hired or they become discouraged by re-
jections and exit the job market. A worker must pay a small transaction
cost each time he submits a work oer to an employer. As in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1998), each matched worker and employer individually chooses
to shirk or cooperate on the work-site, and these choices are made simulta-
neously so that neither has a strategic informational advantage. Any worker
or employer who does not enter an employment relationship during the trade
cycle in question receives an exogenously specied non-employment payment.
Workers and employers evolve their work-site behaviors over time on the basis
of past experiences in an attempt to increase their earnings.
In this labor market, then, full employment with no job vacancies is
possible. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate and the particular set of
workers and employers in employment relationships endogenously evolve over
the course of successive trade cycles. Two interdependent choices made re-
peatedly by the workers and the employers shape this evolutionary process:
namely, their choices of work-site partners; and their behavioral choices in
interactions with these partners.
Three non-employment payment (NEP) treatments are experimentally
studied: a zero NEP; a low NEP; and a high NEP. As reported in Table 1.1,
one main nding is that the average utility levels attained by workers and
employers do not substantially change as the NEP is increased from zero to
high. As will be claried in Section 1.4, although the increase in the NEP
increases the worker unemployment rate and the employer vacancy rate, this
greater loss of productive activity is oset in part by the higher NEP and in
part by the increased levels of mutual cooperation exhibited by the workers
and employers who manage to match.
Another main nding reported in Table 1.1 is that a somewhat higher
average utility level for workers and employers is attained with a low NEP
than with either a zero or a high NEP in the short and intermediate runs
(generations 1 through 50). As will be explained more carefully in Section 1.4,
a zero NEP encourages shirking on the work-site (low risk of quits or rings
in reponse to defections) while a high NEP results in a high risk of lost
earnings due to coordination failure (high risk of quits or rings in response
to defections). Interestingly, however, average utility tends to increase over
time under each NEP treatment as the workers and employers become better
at sustaining mutual cooperation on the work-site. Moreover, this movement
towards higher average utility is strongest under the high NEP treatment.
Thus, in the long run (generation 1000), the average utility level attained by
workers and employers with a high NEP exceeds the average utility levels
attained with a zero or low NEP.
On the other hand, program costs should be taken into account as well
as utility benets in order to obtain a more accurate measure of economic
eciency. Let net earnings be measured by the average (per agent) utility4 1 Evolution of Worker-EmployerNetworks and BehaviorsUnder Alternative Non-Employment Bene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level attained by workers and employers minus the average NEP paid to these
workers and employers. Dene eciency to be the ratio of actual net earnings
to maximum possible net earnings. As indicated in Table 1.1, although a high
NEP results in a high average utility level, it also results in a signicantly
lower eciency level than either the zero or low NEP due to high program
costs. Overall, considering the short, intermediate, and long run, the low
NEP delivers the highest overall eciency level. Consequently, evaluated in
terms of eciency, our ndings indicate that a low NEP is preferable to either
a zero or a high NEP.
The aggregate outcomes reported in Table 1.1, while interesting, are only
the tip of the iceberg. A careful study of individual experimental runs in-
dicates that the response of the ACE labor market to changes in the NEP
is much more intricately structured than this table suggests. As reported
in Figure 1.1, the 20 runs generated for each NEP treatment tend to grav-
itate towards one of two \attractor states." The conguration of these two
attractor states is similar under the zero and low NEP treatments: the rst
attractor state is characterized by latched pairs of mutually cooperative work-
ers and employers, while the second attractor state is characterized by latched
pairs of workers and employers who intermittently defect and cooperate. In
contrast, under the high NEP treatment, one attractor state is characterized
by latched pairs of mutually cooperative workers and employers while the
other attractor state is a state of economic collapse in which each worker and
employer ultimately becomes inactive. This apparent existence of multiple
attractor states suggests caution in interpreting the aggregate outcomes re-
ported in Table 1.1, since these outcomes could be based on inappropriately
pooled data.
The existence of multiple attractor states for each NEP treatment is due
to strong network and learning eects. Starting from the same initial struc-
tural conditions, chance dierences in the initial interaction patterns among
the workers and employers can cause the labor market to evolve towards per-
sistent interaction networks supporting sharply distinct types of expressed
behaviors. For example, with a high NEP, the labor market evolves either
towards a highly ecient economy in which all workers and employers are
in long-run mutually cooperative relationships or towards economic collapse
with 100% unemployment. Thus, while a change in the level of the NEP can
be expected to have substantial systematic eects on key labor market out-
comes such as eciency and unemployment, our ndings suggest that these
eects will be in the form of spectral (multiple peaked) distributions with
large standard deviations.
These computational experiment ndings can be compared to ndings
reported in Pingle and Tesfatsion (2002) for a human-subject experiment us-
ing a similarly structured labor market but with a smaller number of workers
and employers participating in a much smaller number of trade cyces per
experimental session. In the human-subject experiment, as in the computa-1.2 The ACE Labor Market Model 5
tional experiment, a higher NEP resulted in higher average unemployment
and vacancy rates as well as higher average utility levels among those who
successfully matched. In the human-subject experiment, however, most rela-
tionships that formed between workers and employers were either short-lived
or intermittent, with only modest amounts of behavioral coordination in ev-
idence. In contrast, in the computational experiment almost all workers and
employers who succeeded in matching ended up in long-run relationships with
one partner in which the behaviors of the partners were highly coordinated.
As detailed more carefully in Pingle and Tesfatsion (2002), this dierence
in ndings raises interesting questions. To what extent are the human-subject
and computational experiments capturing the same economic structure but
reporting over dierent time scales, short run versus long run? In partic-
ular, could it be that the \shadow of the past" weighs heavily on human
subjects over the necessarily shorter human-subject trials, biasing behaviors
towards unknown past points of reference? If so, the computational experi-
ment might be providing the more accurate prediction of what would happen
in actual labor markets over a longer span of time. Alternatively, the two
experiments might dier structurally in some fundamental way so that dier-
ences in outcomes would be observed regardless of time scale. In particular,
is the representation of agent learning in the computational experiment too
inaccurate to permit valid comparisons with human-subject labor market ex-
periments? Are the observed dierences in types of network formations due
to the dierent frequencies with which transaction costs are incurred due to
scale eects? Careful additional studies, both empirical and experimental,
will be needed to resolve these questions.
The ACE labor market model is presented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3
outlines the experimental design of our study, and Section 1.4 provides a de-
tailed report of our experimental ndings. Concluding remarks are presented
in Section 1.5.
1.2 The ACE Labor Market Model
Overview:
The ACE labor market comprises 12 workers and 12 employers. Each
worker can work for at most one employer at any given time, and each
employer can employ at most one worker at any given time. The workers
and employers repeatedly seek preferred work-site partners using a modied
form of a matching mechanism (Gale-Shapley, 1962) that has been observed
to evolve in various real-world labor market settings (Roth and Sotomayor,
1992). The workers and employers who successfully match then engage in
risky work-site interactions modeled as prisoner's dilemma games. At reg-
ular intervals the workers and employers separately update their work-site
rules of behavior on the basis of the past earnings obtained with these rules.
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Network Game Laboratory (TNG Lab), an agent-based computational labo-
ratory developed by McFadzean, Stewart, and Tesfatsion (2001) for studying
the evolution of trade networks via real-time animations, tables, and graph-
ical displays.3 The specic TNG parameter settings used for the experiment
at hand are described below. All other TNG parameter settings are the same
as in Tesfatsion (2001).
Implementation Details:
As depicted in Table 1.2, ACE labor market activities are divided into a
sequence of 1000 generations. Each generation in turn is divided into three
parts: (a) a trade cycle loop consisting of successive trade cycles during
which work-site interactions take place; (b) an environment step in which
each worker and employer assesses their current utility (tness) level as a
function of their accumulated earnings to date; and (c) an evolution step in
which the workers and employers separately evolve their work-site rules of
behavior on the basis of the past earnings attained with these rules.
Each worker and employer in the initial generation is assigned a work-
site rule in the form of a randomly specied pure strategy for playing an
iterated prisoner's dilemma game with an arbitrary partner an indenite
number of times. This work-site rule governs the behavior of the agent in his
work-site interactions throughout the entire trade cycle loop for the initial
generation. Each work-site rule is represented by means of a \nite state
automaton"4 with 16 internal states. Thus, the set of feasible work-site rules
for each worker and employer, while extremely large, is nevertheless nite.
Each worker and employer in the initial generation also assigns an initial
expected utility assessment Uo to each of his possible work-site partners,
where Uo is equal to the mutual cooperation payo.5
The workers and employers in the initial generation then participate in a
trade cycle loop consisting of 150 successive trade cycles. In each trade cycle
they engage in two main activities: (1) a matching process during which they
search for preferred work-site partners on the basis of their current expected
utility assessments for these partners; and (2) an employment process during
which each matched worker-employer pair engages in one work-site interac-
tion. Throughout these processes the workers and employers update their
current expected utility assessments for each other every time they obtain a
payo from an interaction with each other.
3See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm for source code, executables,
user instructions, tutorials, and research related to the TNG Lab.
4A nite state automaton is a system comprising a nite collection of internal states
together with a state transition function that gives the next state of the system as a
function of the current state and other current system inputs. For the application at hand,
the latter inputs are the actions selected by a worker and employer engaged in a work-site
interaction.
5This is not an innocuous specication, since it strongly aects the extent to which the
workers and employers engage in experimentation with new partners. This issue is further
considered in Section 1.3.1.2 The ACE Labor Market Model 7
Each worker and employer also has an exogenously specied minimum
tolerance level, assigned as part of the initial generation conguration process.
In the current experiment, these minimum tolerance levels are set equal to the
non-employment payment. Thus, entering into a risky work-site interaction
is viewed as a tolerable gamble if and only if it is expected to yield at least
as high a payo as would be earned through inactivity. If the expected
utility assessment assigned to an employer by a worker ever falls below the
minimum tolerance level, the worker will stop directing work oers to this
employer. Similarly, if the expected utility assessment assigned to a worker
by an employer ever drops below the minimum tolerance level, the employer
will stop accepting work oers from this worker.
The manner in which workers direct work oers to employers during the
matching process for each trade cycle proceeds as follows. Each worker and
employer has a preference ranking over possible partners, determined by his
current expected utility assessments. Each worker starts by directing a work
oer to a most preferred tolerable employer. Each employer receiving at
least one tolerable work oer places his most preferred tolerable work oer
on his work oer list and refuses all the rest. Each worker having a work
oer refused then redirects this work oer to a next most preferred tolerable
employer who has not yet refused him in the current matching process, if any
such employer exists. Once employers stop receiving new work oers, they
accept the work oers currently on their work oer lists and the matching
process comes to a close. Throughout this process, ties are broken by random
selection.
Once a worker and employer are matched, they enter into a work-site
interaction. This interaction is modeled as a prisoner's dilemma game with
cooperation interpreted as meeting all work-site obligations and defection
interpreted as shirking with regard to these obligations. As depicted in Ta-
ble 1.3, one of four possible payos can be earned in each work-site inter-
action: a low payo L=10, earned by an agent who cooperates against a
defecting partner; a mutual defection payo D=20; a mutual cooperation
payo C=40; or a high payo H=60 earned by an agent who defects against
a cooperating partner. Also, a worker incurs an oer cost OC=1.0 each time
he directs a work oer to an employer, whether or not the work oer is ac-
cepted. A worker or employer who is not matched earns a non-employment
payment (NEP) for the trade cycle. Each worker and employer records all
payos he receives during the course of each trade cycle, including work-site
payos, negative payos due to oer costs, and non-employment payments.
Each worker and employer uses a simple reinforcement learning algorithm
to update his expected utility assessments for possible partners in response to
new payos. Recall that each agent (worker or employer) initially assigns an
initial expected utility assessment Uo=C to each possible work-site partner.
Subsequently, each time an agent v interacts with an agent z, agent v forms
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all payos received to date from interactions with z and dividing this sum by
one plus the total number of these interactions. The payos included in this
summation include work-site payos and negative payos due to oer costs.
Consequently, an updated expected utility assessment for any agent z is the
average of all payments received to date in interactions with z, augmented
to include Uo as a virtual additional payo. Under this method, if an agent
interacts repeatedly with another agent for a sucient length of time, his
expected utility assessment for z will eventually approach his true average
payo level from interactions with z.6
At the end of the initial generation, the workers and employers enter into
an environment step in which each agent calculates his utility (tness) level.
This utility level is taken to be the average total net payos per trade cycle
that the agent earned during the course of the preceding trade cycle loop, i.e.,
the agent's total net payos divided by 150 (the number of trade cycles per
loop). The workers and employers then enter into an evolution step in which
they use their attained utility levels to evolve (structurally update) their
work-site rules via both inductive and social learning. Inductive learning
takes the form of experimentation; agents perturb their work-site rules by
introducing random modications. Social learning takes the form of mimicry;
agents deliberately modify their work-site rules to more closely resemble the
work-site rules used by more successful (higher utility) agents of their own
type. Thus, workers imitate other more successful workers, and employers
imitate other more successful employers.
Experimentation and mimicry are separately implemented for workers
and for employers by means of genetic algorithms involving commonly used
elitism, mutation, and recombination operations. Elitism ensures that the
most successful work-site rules are retained unchanged from one generation
to the next. Mutation ensures that workers and employers continually exper-
iment with new work-site rules (inductive learning). Recombination ensures
that workers and employers continually engage in mimicry (social learning).7
At the end of the evolution step, each worker and employer has a poten-
tially new work-site rule. The memory of each worker and employer is then
wiped clean of all past work-site experiences. In particular, initial expected
utility assessments for possible partners are re-set to the mutual cooperation
payo level without regard for past work-site experiences. The workers and
employers then enter into a new generation and the whole process repeats,
for a total of 1000 generations in all.8
6See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) for more details. Brie
y, this long-run consis-
tency property follows from the nite state automaton representation for work-site rules
which ensures that the action pattern between any two agents who repeatedly interact
must eventually enter into a cycle as the number of their interactions becomes suciently
large.
7See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) and Tesfatsion (2001) for detailed discussions of
this use of genetic algorithms to implement the evolution of work-site rules.
8A nal technical remark about implementation should also be noted, in case others
wish to replicate or extend this experiment. The minimum tolerance level is hardwired1.3 The Computational Experiment 9
1.3 The Computational Experiment
The computational experiment focuses on only one treatment variable, the
non-employment payment (NEP). The three tested treatments for NEP are
NEP=0, NEP=15, and NEP=30. These three treatments are referred to as
ZeroT, LowT, and HighT, respectively.
The interest in these three alternative treatments is seen by comparing
them with the work-site payos depicted in Table 1.3. In treatment ZeroT,
non-employment during a trade cycle results in the payment NEP=0. This is
the worst possible trade cycle payo, worse even than the sucker payo L=10
that results from cooperating with a defecting work-site partner. In treatment
ZeroT, then, unemployment or vacancy is never an attractive alternative to
employment or hiring, and the workers and employers will be willing to put
up with defections to avoid unemployment or vacancy.
In contrast, in treatment LowT non-employment during a trade cycle
results in the payment NEP=15. This payment is strictly higher than the
sucker payo L=10, meaning agents will prefer non-employment to being
suckered. Thus, each agent who defects against a cooperative partner to at-
tain a high payo now faces a risk of future non-employment if this current
partner chooses not to interact with him in the future. Finally, in treatment
HighT non-employment results in the payment NEP=30. This payment dom-
inates both the sucker payo L=10 and the mutual defection payo D=20.
Consequently, agents will tend to be much more sensitive to defections, pre-
ferring unemployment or vacancy in preference to defecting back against a
defecting partner.
For each NEP treatment, 20 runs were generated using 20 dierent seeds
for the TNG Lab pseudo-random number generator: namely, f0;5;10;:::;95g.
In the data tables reported in Section 1.4, each run is identied by its cor-
responding seed value. Each run consists of 1000 generations in total. To
investigate evolutionary change, the twenty runs for each treatment are sam-
pled at three dierent points in time: generation 12, generation 50, and
to zero in the TNG Lab, the software used to implement the computational experiment.
Thus, to retain the non-employment payment NEP equal to the minimum tolerance level,
experiments were actually run with each work-site payo normalized by subtraction of
NEP. In addition, for better TNG Lab visualization, the work-site payos were further
normalized by multiplication by 0.10. For example, C* = 0.10[C-NEP] was used in place
of the mutual cooperation payo C, and similarly for the other work-site payos. The cor-
responding normalized non-employment payment then equaled NEP* = 0.10[NEP-NEP]
= 0. Finally, to maintain consistency with this normalization, the oer cost OC was nor-
malized to OC*=0.10. Note that it would not be consistent to subtract NEP from OC,
since OC is a cost per work oer. For example, a worker who is refused k times and never
hired during a trade cycle receives a total payo NEP-kOC at the end of the trade cycle,
and this is the payo from which NEP must then be subtracted to implement the payo
normalization. This subtraction occurs automatically when NE*=0 is used in place of
NEP. In all data tables presented below, utility levels and market power levels are trans-
lated back into non-normalized form prior to reporting, for easier comparison with the
human-subject experimental 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generation 1000. For each sampled generation, data is collected regarding
network formation, market non-participation rates, work-site behaviors, wel-
fare (utility and market power) outcomes, and persistent relationship type
counts.
Before reporting our experimental ndings in detail, it is important to
explain carefully the descriptive statistics that have been constructed to help
characterize the one-to-many mapping between treatment and outcomes.
Measurement of Persistent Relationships:
As previously noted (see footnote 4), work-site rules are represented as
nite state automata, implying that the actions undertaken by any one agent
in repeated work-site interactions with another agent must eventually cycle.
Consequently, the actions of any one agent in interactions with another agent
during a trade cycle loop can be summarized in the form of a work-site history
H:P. The \handshake" H is a (possibly null) string of work-site actions that
form a non-repeated pattern, while the \persistent portion" P is a (possibly
null) string of work-site actions that are cyclically repeated. For example,
letting c denote cooperation and d denote defection, the work-site history
ddd:dc for an agent v in interactions with another agent z indicates that v
defected against z in his rst three work-site interactions with z and thereafter
alternated between defection and cooperation.
A worker and employer are said to exhibit a persistent relationship during
a given trade cycle loop if two conditions hold. First, their work-site histories
with each other during the course of this loop each have non-null persistent
portions. Second, accepted work oers between the worker and employer
do not permanently cease during this loop either by choice (a permanent
switch away to a strictly preferred partner) or by refusal (one agent becomes
intolerable to the other because of too many defections).
A persistent relationship between a worker and employer in a given trade
cycle loop is said to be latched if the worker works continually for the em-
ployer (i.e., in every successive trade cycle) during the persistent portions of
their work-site histories. Otherwise, the persistent relationship is said to be
recurrent.
Measurement of Market Non-Participation Rates:
A worker or employer who fails to form any persistent relationship dur-
ing a given trade cycle loop is classied as persistently non-employed for
that trade cycle loop. The percentage of workers who are persistently non-
employed constitutes the persistent unemployment rate for that trade cy-
cle loop. Similarly, the percentage of employers who are persistently non-
employed constitutes the persistent vacancy rate for that trade cycle loop.
Classication of Networks by Competitive Distance:
We will next construct a distance measure that permits the classica-
tion of experimentally observed \interaction networks" into alternative types.
This distance measure will calculate the distance between an experimentally1.3 The Computational Experiment 11
observed interaction network and an idealized interaction network capable of
supporting a competitive (full employment) market outcome.
Recall from Table 1.2 that each generation G of the ACE labor market
model consists of a single trade cycle loop plus an environment step and an
evolution step. The interaction network N(G,R) for a particular generation
G in a particular experimental run R refers to the observed pattern of inter-
actions occurring among workers and employers in the trade cycle loop for
that generation and run.
Each interaction network N(G,R) is represented in the form of a directed
graph. The vertices V of the graph represent the workers and employers.
The edges of the graph (directed arrows) represent work oers directed from
workers to employers. Finally, the edge weight on any edge denotes the num-
ber of accepted work oers between the worker and employer connected by
the edge. The reduced-form network PN(G,R) derived from N(G,R) by elim-
inating all edges of N(G,R) that correspond to non-persistent relationships
is referred to as the persistent network corresponding to N(G,R).
In a standard competitive equilibrium situation, workers are indierent
among employers oering the same working conditions and employers are
indierent among workers oering identical labor services. Moreover, workers
oering the same labor services have the same ex ante expected employment
rate and employers oering the same working conditions have the same ex
ante expected vacancy rate.
In the current labor market model, these same market characteristics
would tend to prevail if all workers and employers always cooperated. In
the latter case, due to indierence, workers would randomly distribute their
work oers across all employers and employers would randomly select work
oers from among all work oers received. The resulting interaction pattern
would therefore tend to be fully recurrent (no latching and no persistent
non-employment) with equal ex ante expected employment rates and vacancy
rates for workers and employers, respectively. For these reasons, the following
interaction pattern among workers and employers is referred to below as a
competitive interaction pattern: Each worker is recurrently directing work
oers to employers, and every worker and employer has at least one persistent
relationship.
The network distance for any persistent network PN(G,R) is then dened
to be the number of vertices (agents) in PN(G,R) whose edges (persistent
relationships) fail to conform to the competitive interaction pattern. By
construction, then, a distance measure of 0 indicates zero deviation and a
distance measure of 24 (the total number of workers and employers) indicates
maximum deviation. In particular, a perfectly recurrent persistent network
has a network distance of 0, a perfectly latched persistent network has a
network distance of 12, and a perfectly disconnected persistent network (no
persistent relationships) has a network distance of 24.
Classi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A worker or employer in generation G of a run R is called a never-provoked
defector (NPD) if he ever defects against another agent that has not previ-
ously defected against him. The percentages of workers and employers who
are NPDs measure the extent to which these agents behave opportunistically
in work-site interactions with partners who are strangers or who so far have
been consistently cooperative.
A worker or employer in generation G of a run R is referred to as a per-
sistent intermittent defector (IntD) if he establishes at least one persistent
relationship for which his persistent portion consists of a non-trivial mix of
defections and cooperations. The agent is referred to as a persistent defec-
tor (AllD) if he establishes at least one persistent relationship and if the
persistent portion of each of his persistent relationships consists entirely of
defections. Finally, the agent is referred to as a persistent cooperator (AllC) if
he establishes at least one persistent relationship and if the persistent portion
of each of his persistent relationships consists entirely of cooperations. By
construction, an agent in generation G of a run R satises one and only one
of the following four agent-type classications: persistently non-employed; a
persistent intermittent defector; a persistent defector; or a persistent coop-
erator.
Two important points can be made about this classication of agent types.
First, in contrast to standard game theory, the agents coevolve their types
over time. This coevolution is in response to past experiences, starting from
initially random behavioral specications. Thus, agent typing is endogenous.
Second, agent typing is measured in terms of persistently expressed behav-
iors, not in terms of work-site rules. An agent may have coevolved into an
AllC in terms of expressed behaviors with current work-site partners, based
on past work-site experiences with these partners, while still retaining the
capability of defecting against a new untried partner. Indeed, work-site rules
continually coevolve in the evolution step through mutation and recombina-
tion operations even if expressed behaviors appear to have largely stabilized.
This ceaseless change in work-site rules makes any apparent stabilization in
the distribution of agent types all the more surprising and interesting.
Measurement of Utility and Market Power Outcomes:
The utility level of a worker or employer at the end of generation G in a
run R is measured by the average total net payos per trade cycle that the
agent earns during the course of the trade cycle loop for generation G.
With regard to market power, we adopt the standard industrial organi-
zation approach: namely, market power is measured by the degree to which
the actual utility levels attained by workers and employers compare against
an idealized competitive yardstick. We take as this yardstick a situation in
which there is absence of strategic behavior, symmetric treatment of equals,
and full employment. Specically, we dene competitive market conditions
for the ACE labor market to be a situation in which each worker is recur-
rently directing work oers to employers, and each worker and employer is a1.4 Experimental Findings 13
persistent cooperator (AllC).
Ignoring oer costs, the utility level that each worker and employer would
attain under these competitive market conditions is simply the mutual coop-
eration payo level, C. Therefore, as in Pingle and Tesfatsion (2001,2002), we
dene the market power (MPow) of each worker or employer in generation
G of a run R to be the extent to which their attained utility level, U, diers
from C: that is, MPow = (U-C)/C.
Classication of Persistent Relationship Types:
A persistent relationship between a worker and employer in generation G
of a run R is classied in accordance with the persistent behaviors expressed
by the two participants in this particular relationship.
If both participants are persistent intermittent defectors (IntDs), the re-
lationship is classied as mutual intermittent defection (M-IntD). If both
participants are persistent defectors (AllDs), the relationship is classied as
mutual defection (M-AllD). If both participants are persistent cooperators
(AllCs), the relationship is classied as mutual cooperation (M-AllC). Note
that the relative shirking rates for an M-IntD relationship can be deduced
for the participant worker and employer by examining their relative market
power levels.
A persistent relationship in which the worker and employer express dis-
tinct types of behaviors is indicated in hyphenated form, with the worker's
behavior indicated rst. For example, a persistent relationship involving a




The results for the computational experiment display a startling degree
of regularity. This regularity is visible as early as the twelfth generation and
persists through generation 1000.
For each of the three NEP treatments ZeroT, LowT, and HighT, the
twenty trial runs tend to cluster into two distinct attractor states. Each at-
tractor state supports a distinct conguration of market non-participation
rates, work-site behaviors, utility levels, market power outcomes, and persis-
tent relationship types. These attractor states can be Pareto-ranked, in the
sense that the average utility levels attained by workers and by employers are
both markedly higher in one of the two attractor states. The exact form of
the attractor states varies systematically across the three NEP treatments.
Network Formation:
For each of the twenty runs corresponding to each treatment ZeroT,
LowT, and HighT, the form of the persistent network was determined at three14 1 Evolution of Worker-EmployerNetworks and BehaviorsUnder Alternative Non-Employment Bene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sampling points: generation 12; generation 50; and generation 1000. Using
the network distance measure dened in Section 1.3, the distribution of these
persistent networks across runs was then plotted, conditional on treatment
and sampled generation. Thus, a total of nine network distributions were
plotted, three for each of the three treatments.
These nine network distributions are depicted in Figure 1.1. Network
distance is measured along the horizontal axes and the number of runs clus-
tered at this network distance is indicated on the vertical axes. Recall that
a network distance of 0 corresponds to a perfectly recurrent (\competitive")
persistent network, a network distance of 12 correspondsto a perfectly latched
persistent network, and a network distance of 24 corresponds to a perfectly
disconnected persistent network (no persistent relationships).
In treatment ZeroT, perfectly latched networks are strongly dominant
even by generation 12. For each sampled generation, all but one or two of
the twenty runs exhibit persistent networks consisting of perfectly latched
worker-employer pairs. This is indicated by the sharp peak in the network
distribution at network distance 12.
In treatment LowT, perfectly latched networks are again dominant. Nev-
ertheless, at each sampled generation, the network distribution is less sharply
peaked at network distance 12 than it was for treatment ZeroT.
In treatment HighT, a new phenomenon arises. For each sampled gen-
eration, seven runs out of twenty lie at network distance 24, indicating that
the workers and employers in these runs have failed to form any persistent
relationships. At generation 12, the remaining 13 runs are scattered over
network distances from 0 to 23. By generation 1000, however, the network
distribution displays two sharp peaks, one at network distance 12 (latching)
and one at network distance 24 (complete coordination failure).
Figure 1.1 also indicates the behavioral modes supported by each network
distribution. For example, consider the 19 runs clustered at network distance
12 for the ZeroT treatment sampled at generation 50. Figure 1.1 indicates
that workers and employers generally attained M-IntD (mutual intermittent
defection) relationships in 11 of the runs and M-AllC (mutual cooperation)
relationships in the remaining 8 runs.
Overall Utility and Eciency Levels:
As indicated in Table 1.1, the following results are obtained for the average
(per agent) utility achieved by workers and employers across treatments. For
generations 12 and 50, average utility is highest in treatment LowT. By gen-
eration 1000, however, average utility is actually highest in treatment HighT.
The latter nding results from the high NEP for inactive agents as well as
the previously noted observation that workers and employers who do manage
to match under treatment HighT become increasingly more successful over
time at coordinating on persistent mutual cooperation (the rst attractor
state) rather than persistent non-employment (the second attractor state).
Although this evolution over time of increased cooperative behavior between1.4 Experimental Findings 15
matched workers and employers is observed under all three NEP treatments,
it is observed most strongly for treatment HighT.
On the other hand, consider the overall level of economic eciency at-
tained under each NEP treatment, where eciency takes into account both
utility benets and program costs. Specically, for each NEP treatment, let
net earnings be measured as the average utility level attained by workers and
employers minus the average NEP paid to workers and employers. Ignoring
oer costs, the maximum possible net earnings under each NEP treatment is
the mutual cooperation payo 40, attained by mutually cooperative workers
and employers in latched pairings. For each NEP treatment, let eciency
be measured by actual net earnings as a percentage of 40. As indicated in
Table 1.1, eciency is substantially lower under treatment HighT than under
treatments ZeroT or LowT. In particular, the relatively higher average utility
level attained under treatment HighT at generation 1000 is more than oset
by the higher average NEP to unemployed workers and vacant employers.
In contrast, program costs are miniminal at all sampled generations under
treatments ZeroT and LowT since unemployment and vacancy rates remain
close to zero. As Table 1.1 indicates, evaluated in terms of eciency, the best
program option overall turns out to be the low NEP.
Table 1.4 provides a breakdown of the average utility levels reported in
Table 1.1 by agent type (workers and employers) and by attractor state for
each of the three NEP treatments. The generally higher average utility levels
attained by employers re
ects in part the structural asymmetry that workers
shoulder all of the oer (transaction) costs associated with network formation
and maintainence. As detailed below, in some cases this structural asymme-
try also appears to provide employers a strategic advantage in their work-site
interactions.
Market Non-Participation Rates, Work-Site Behaviors, Utility Lev-
els, and Market Power Levels:
Table 1.5 reports market non-participation rates, work-site behaviors,
utility levels, and market power outcomes for the twenty runs constituting
treatment ZeroT, each sampled at generation 12. These descriptive statistics
are reported separately for each of the twenty individual runs comprising this
treatment. More precisely, for each run, the following descriptive statistics
are given: Persistent unemployment rate for workers (UnE-w); Persistent
vacancy rate for employers (Vac-e); A count of never-provoked defectors for
workers (NPD-w) and employers (NPD-e); A count of intermittent defectors
for workers (IntD-w) and employers (IntD-e); A count of always-defectors
for workers (AllD-w) and employers (AllD-e); A count of always-cooperators
for workers (AllC-w) and employers (AllC-e); Mean utility level for workers
(Util-w) with standard deviation (Util-w SD); Mean utility level for employ-
ers (Util-e) with standard deviation (Util-e SD); Mean market power level
attained by workers (MPow-w); Mean market power level attained by em-
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The twenty runs in Table 1.5 are grouped together, rst in accordance
with their network distance (NetD), and second in accordance with the type
of work-site behaviors expressed by the workersand employers. This grouping
reveals that the runs are essentially clustered into two distinct attractor states
comprising 18 runs in total, each run exhibiting a perfectly latched persistent
network pattern (NetD=12). The remaining two runs f5;7g comprise a mix
of recurrent and latched relationships and appear to be transition states
between the two attractor states. The workers attain very low mean market
power levels in the transition-state runs. This is due to the substantial oer
costs they accumulate from refused work oers in the course of maintaining
their recurrent relationships.
In the rst attractor state comprising four runs f30;50;90;65g, 77% of
the workers and 71% of the employers are AllCs (persistent cooperators).
Despite the prevalence of AllC agent types, the employers attain an average
mean market power level (MPow-e = -0.00) that is markedly higher than the
corresponding level obtained by the workers(Mpow-w = -0.12). This is due to
the oer costs incurred by workers in the process of forming and sustaining
the persistent latched networks and to the modestly higher percentages of
NPD (non-provoked defection), IntD (persistent intermittent defection), and
AllD (persistent defection) exhibited by employers.
In the second attractor state comprising fourteen runs f60;35;:::;70g,
very high percentages of the workers and the employers are NPDs and IntDs.
Interestingly, the workers and employers obtain similar average mean market
power levels in this second attractor state (-0.20 for workers and -0.17 for
employers). However, these levels are substantially lower than the average
mean market power levels they attain in the rst attractor state. Thus, in
terms of this market power measure, the rst attractor state Paretodominates
the second attractor state.
In parallel to Table 1.5, Table 1.6 reports persistent relationship type
counts for treatment ZeroT sampled at generation 12. As in Table 1.5, data
are reported for the two transient-state runs f5;7g plus the eighteen remain-
ing runs grouped into the two attractor states.
The most striking aspect of Table 1.6 is the almost complete lack of mixed
persistent relationships, i.e., relationships in which the participant worker and
employer are expressing distinct types of behaviors. In particular, Table 1.6
reveals that the rst attractor state comprising four runs f30;50;90;65g is
dominated by mutual cooperation (M-AllC) whereas the second attractor
state comprising 14 runs f60;35;:::;70g is dominated by mutual intermittent
defection (M-IntD). Mutual defection (M-AllD) is almost entirely absent.
The mean market power levels reported in Table 1.6 reveal, however,
that the shirking rates expressed by the workers and employers in their M-
IntD relationships in the second attractor state are not generally balanced in
any given run. Rather, in about half the runs the workers shirk more than
the employers, and in the remaining half the employers shirk more than the1.4 Experimental Findings 17
workers. Thus, although the average mean market power levels attained by
workers and employers in this second attractor state are very close, this hides
an underlying volatility in relative shirking rates across runs.
The characteristics reported in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 for treatment
ZeroT sampled at generation 12 are largely maintained in generation 50 and
in generation 1000. One interesting observation, however, is that individual
runs can traverse from one attractor state to another as time proceeds. For
example, run 30 is in the rst attractor state in generation 12, appears as a
transition state in generation 50, and ends up in the second attractor state
by generation 1000. Conversely, run 60 is in the second attractor state in
generation 12 but ends up in the rst attractor state by generation 1000.
A second interesting observation is that the number of runs lying in each
attractor state evens out over time. In generation 12, the cooperative rst
attractor state comprises only four runs while the second attractor state
dominated by intermittent defection comprises fourteen runs. By generation
50, the rst attractor state comprises eight runs while the second attractor
state comprises 11 runs. By generation 1000, each attractor state comprises
exactly nine runs. Thus, on average, agents over time are improving their
ability to coordinate on mutual cooperation.
As in treatment ZeroT, the twenty runs comprising treatment LowT,
sampled at generation 12, can be clustered into two attractor states together
with a collection of transition states. The rst attractor state comprises
six runs characterized by perfect latching and a high percentage of AllC
agent types in M-AllC relationships. The second attractor state comprises
eight runs characterized by almost perfect latching and a high percentage
of IntD agent types in M-IntD relationships. The six transition-state runs
each comprise a mix of latched and recurrent relationships and have a high
percentage of IntD agent types in M-IntD relationships.
In contrast to treatment ZeroT, however, the number of transition-state
runs is larger (six runs instead of two) for treatment LowT sampled at gen-
eration 12. This is consistent with the network distribution data reported in
Figure 1.1. The latter data reveal that, for each sampled generation, the peak
at network distance 12 (latching) for treatment LowT is less pronounced than
the peak at distance 12 for treatment zeroT. This indicates that the workers
and employers in treatment LowT take longer on average to coordinate into
perfect latched networks than the workers and employers in treatment ZeroT.
Also in contrast to treatment ZeroT, the average mean market power
levels attained by workers and employers in treatment LowT, sampled at
generation 12, are not balanced in the second attractor. The employers attain
a level of -0.08, whereas the workers attain a markedly lower level of -0.16.
The second attractor is dominated by latched relationships, indicating that
each worker is persistently incurring only one oer cost per trade cycle. Since
each oer cost is small relative to trade payos, only 1.0, it follows that
accumulation of o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power. Rather, since the second attractor state is dominated by M-IntD
relationships, this discrepancy indicates that the employers are managing
to shirk at a substantially higher rate than the workers in these M-IntD
relationships.
The outcomes for treatment LowT sampled at generation 1000 closely
resemble the outcomes reported in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 for treatment
ZeroT sampled at generation 12. The rst attractor state comprises nine runs
strongly dominated by M-AllC relationships, and the second attractor state
comprises seven runs strongly dominated by M-IntD relationships. (Hence,
an increase in the size of the rst attractor state is observed for treatment
LowT in moving from generation 12 to generation 1000.) Mixed types of
relationships are almost entirely absent in the two attractor states. In the
rst attractor state the workers and employers attain average mean market
power levels of -0.04 and -0.03, respectively. In the second attractor state the
workers and employers attain uniformly lower but balanced average mean
market power levels of -0.15. As for treatment ZeroT, this balance hides an
underlying volatility in shirking rates across runs.
Table 1.7 reports market non-participation rates, work-site behaviors,
utility levels, and market power outcomes for the twenty runs constituting
treatment HighT, sampled at generation 12. Table 1.8 reports persistent
relationship type counts for these same runs, again sampled at generation
12. As for the previous two treatments, the twenty runs can be clustered into
two attractor states together with a scattering of transition states. Moreover,
once again the runs in the rst attractor state exhibit perfectly (or almost
perfectly) latched persistent networks with a high percentage of AllC agent
types. Nevertheless, the nature of the second attractor state is dramatically
dierent. Whereas in the previous two treatments the second attractor state
was dominated by M-IntD relationships, now the second attractor state corre-
sponds to complete or almost complete coordination failure. More precisely,
the network distance for the runs in the second attractor state varies from 22
(only two persistent relationships) to 24 (no persistent relationships). With a
high non-employment payment, agents are opting for non-employment rather
than choosing to remain in M-IntD relationships.
As also seen for treatments ZeroT and LowT, increased coordination on
the rst attractor state occurs over time for treatment HighT. In generation
12, the rst attractor state comprises ve runs, the second attractor state
comprises 9 runs, and the six remaining runs are scattered across transition
states. Also, in the rst attractor state, an average of 9.8 out of the 12 persis-
tent relationships in each run are M-AllC. By generation 1000, however, the
rst attractor state comprises 11 runs, the second attractor state comprises
seven runs, and only two runs are in a transition state. Moreover, in the rst
attractor state, an average of 10.73 out of the 12 persistent relationships in
each run are M-AllC.
Summarizing the relative market power outcomes of workers and employ-1.4 Experimental Findings 19
ers in each treatment, the following regularities are observed. For every treat-
ment, in each sampled generation, the employers consistently attain a higher
average market power level than workers in the cooperative rst attractor
state. This dierence is attributable to the relatively higher (although small)
incidence of NPD, IntD, and AllD behaviors among employers and to the fact
that oer costs are borne solely by the worker. Also, for treatments ZeroT
and HighT, the workers and employers attain essentially the same average
market power levels in the second attractor state in each sampled genera-
tion; and the same is true for treatment LowT when sampled in generation
1000. A balanced market power level in the second attractor state indicates
either that workers and employers have essentially the same shirking rates
on average (treatments ZeroT and LowT) or that all agents are persistently
non-employed (treatment HighT).
With regard to market power in the cooperative rst attractor state com-
pared across treatments, the workers attain a modestly negative average mar-
ket power level in each treatment in each sampled generation; the levels range
from -0.12 to -0.02. Interestingly, treatments LowT and HighT have a lower
average incidence of NPD behavior and a higher average percentage of M-
AllC relationships per run than treatment ZeroT in this rst attractor state.
Nevertheless, these advantages are oset (in market power terms) by the
higher average oer costs incurred by workers due to the longer time taken
within each generation to establish a persistent network. (For example, as
seen in Table 1.7 for treatment HighT sampled at generation 12, only one
run in the rst attractor state attains a network distance of 12, i.e., a per-
fectly latched persistent network.) In contrast to the workers, employers do
not incur oer costs, hence they attain close to a zero average market power
level in each treatment at each sampled generation in the cooperative rst
attractor state; the levels range from -0.02 to +0.03.
With regard to market power in the second attractor state compared
across treatments, in each sampled generation both the workers and the em-
ployers attain their lowest average levels in treatment HighT. The second
attractor state in treatment HighT is characterized by complete or nearly
complete coordination failure.
Never-Provoked Defection:
The importance of stance toward strangers and rst impressions for de-
termining subsequent outcomes in sequential interactions has been stressed
by Orbell and Dawes (1993) and by Rabin and Schrag (1999). In the present
computational experiment, two sharply dierentiated attractor states exist
for each treatment, the rst dominated by persistent mutual cooperation and
the second dominated either by persistent intermittent defection or by per-
sistent non-employment. Thus, outcomes are strongly path dependent, and
stance towards strangers and rst impressions could play a critical role in
determining these outcomes. These aspects of agent behavior are captured
by counts of never-provoked defection (NPD).20 1 Evolution of Worker-EmployerNetworks and BehaviorsUnder Alternative Non-Employment Benets: An Agent-Based Computational Study
In treatments ZeroT and LowT, NPD is commonly observed in all sam-
pled generations, particularly in the second attractor state dominated by
persistent intermittent defection (IntD). For example, as seen in Table 1.5,
for treatment ZeroT sampled at generation 12, 33% of workers and 38% of
employers engage in NPD in the rst attractor state, and these percentages
rise to 52% and 83%, respectively, for the second attractor state. It would ap-
pear that these high percentages for NPD in the second attractor state might
actually be inducing the resulting predominance of IntD as agents engage in
retaliatory defections. Because the non-employment payment is lower than
the mutual defection payo in these two treatments, agents tend to defect
back against defecting partners rather than simply refusing to interact with
them.
Another interesting observation regarding treatments ZeroT and LowT is
that the incidence of NPD for each agent type in each attractor state tends to
be higher in treatment ZeroT than in treatment LowT. In treatment ZeroT,
the non-employment payment 0 lies below all work-site payos, including the
sucker payo L=10 earned by an agent who cooperates against a defecting
partner. Consequently, there is no risk of refusal on the basis of bad behavior
alone, but only from unfavorable comparisons with other agents. In contrast,
in treatment LowT the non-employment payment 15 lies between the sucker
payo and the mutual defection payo D=20. In this case, then, an oppor-
tunistic agent faces a higher risk of refusal since non-employment is preferred
to a sucker payo.
In treatment HighT the non-employment payment 30 lies above the mu-
tual defection payo for the rst time, and the impact of this change in payo
conguration is substantial. For example, as reported in Table 5, only 13%
of workers and 7% of employers in generation 12 engage in NPD in the rst
attractor state characterized by mutual cooperation. In contrast, 100% of
workers and 97% of employers engage in NPD in the second attractor state
characterized by complete or almost complete coordination failure. The same
pattern holds at generation 50 and generation 1000. Agents are now much
pickier with regard to their partners; an early defection from a partner drops
that partner's expected utility assessment below the non-employment payo
and hence below minimum tolerability.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
As detailed by Roth (2002), recent advances in experimental methods and
game theory using both human subjects and computational agents are now
permitting economists to study a wide variety of complex phenomena associ-
ated with decentralized market economies. Examples include inductive price
discovery, imperfect competition, buyer-seller matching, and the open-ended
co-evolution of individual behaviors and economic institutions.
One interesting branch of this literature is the attempt to exploit syner-1.5 Concluding Remarks 21
gies between experiments with human subjects and experiments with compu-
tational agents by means of parallel experimental designs. The few parallel
experimental studies to date have largely focused on nancial market issues.9
However, we conjecture that parallel experiments will ultimately prove to be
even more valuable when applied to economic processes such as labor markets
in which face-to-face personal relationships play a potentially strong role in
determining market outcomes.
The preliminary ACE labor market study at hand highlights the need to
carefully align parallel experimental designs to ensure valid comparability.
For example, transaction costs must be properly scaled across experiments
to ensure comparable agent incentives, and horizons need to be aligned to
ensure that short-run and long-run eects are properly distinguished.
In future ACE labor market studies, we intend to calibrate our parallel ex-
perimental designs to empirical data. Salient aspects of actual unemployment
benet programs will be incorporated, and ndings from previous empirical
studies of unemployment benet programs will be used wherever possible.
In addition, the recent construction of linked employer-employee (LEE) data
sets is an exciting development facilitating the empirical study of outcomes
generated by worker-employer interactions; see Hammermesh (1999). LEE
data sets complement beautifully the focus of ACE labor market studies on
worker-employer interaction patterns. Consequently, LEE data should per-
mit careful empirical testing of computational ndings related specically
to interaction eects, such as strong path dependence and the existence of
multiple attractors.
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Mutual Cooperation Coordination FailureGeneration 12 Generation 50 Generation 1000
Utility 33.8 (5.9) Utility 35.2 (2.8) Utility 35.8 (3.6)
ZeroT Unemp 0% UnEmp 0% UnEmp 0%
NEP=0 Vacancy 0% Vacancy 0% Vacancy 0%
Eciency 85% Eciency 88% Eciency 90%
Utility 35.4 (3.6) Utility 37.2 (2.0) Utility 35.7 (1.8)
LowT UnEmp 1% UnEmp 0% UnEmp 2%
NEP=15 Vacancy 2% Vacancy 1% Vacancy 3%
Eciency 88% Eciency 93% Eciency 88%
Utility 34.6 (1.0) Utility 35.7 (0.5) Utility 36.4 (0.6)
HighT Unemp 48% Unemp 36% UnEmp 32%
NEP=30 Vacancy 50% Vacancy 36% Vacancy 33%
Eciency 50% Eciency 62% Eciency 67%
Table 1.1: Summary of Aggregate Outcomes: Average agent utility level (with stan-
dard deviation), worker unemployment rate, employer vacancy rate, and eciency level for
each non-employment payment (NEP) treatment.int main () f
InitiateEconomy(); // CONSTRUCT initial subpopulations of
// workers and employers with random
// work-site rules of behavior.
For (G = 1,...,1000) f // ENTER THE GENERATION CYCLE LOOP
// GENERATION CYCLE:
InitiateGen(); // Congure workers and employers
// with user-supplied parameter values
// (initial expected utility assessments,
// minimum tolerance levels,...)
For (TC = 1,...,150) f // ENTER THE TRADE CYCLE LOOP
// TRADE CYCLE:
MatchTraders(); // Workers and employers determine
// their work-site partners, given
// their expected utility assessments,
// and record job search and
// inactivity costs.
Trade(); // Workers and employers engage
// in work-site interactions and
// record their work-site payos.
UpdateExp(); // Workers and employers update their
// expected utility assessments, using
// newly recorded costs and work-site
// payos, and begin a new trade cycle.
g
// ENVIRONMENT STEP:
AssessFitness(); // Each worker and employer assesses
// his utility (tness) level.
// EVOLUTION STEP:
EvolveGen(); // Workers and employers separately
// evolve their work-site rules,









Table 1.3: Payo Matrix for the Work-Site Prisoner's Dilemma GameGeneration 12 Generation 50 Generation 1000
w e w e w e
CoopAtt. 35.4 40.1 CoopAtt. 39.1 40.7 CoopAtt. 36.4 39.9
ZeroT (6.6) (5.5) (1.5) (1.4) (2.7) (3.6)
NEP=0 IntDAtt. 32.2 33.1 IntDAtt. 31.8 32.8 IntDAtt. 33.2 34.2
(5.9) (6.0) (2.7) (2.8) (4.1) (3.2)
Overall 32.5 35.1 Overall 34.0 36.3 Overall 34.7 36.8
(5.9) (5.8) (2.3) (2.5) (3.6) (3.6)
Eciency=85% Eciency=88% Eciency=90%
w e w e w e
CoopAtt. 38.3 40.1 CoopAtt. 38.9 40.8 CoopAtt. 38.5 38.8
LowT (2.3) (2.3) (1.4) (1.4) (0.8) (1.5)
NEP=15 IntDAtt. 33.6 36.7 IntDAtt. 28.0 40.5 IntDAtt. 34.2 33.9
(4.3) (4.4) (2.3) (3.1) (2.1) (2.2)
Overall 34.0 36.8 Overall 35.7 38.6 Overall 36.0 35.3
(3.6) (3.6) (2.0) (2.0) (1.5) (2.0)
Eciency=88% Eciency=93% Eciency=88%
w e w e w e
CoopAtt. 38.1 40.2 CoopAtt. 38.9 40.2 CoopAtt. 38.9 41.3
HighT (2.0) (1.6) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
NEP=30 CFailAtt. 30.2 30.3 CFailAtt. 30.0 30.1 CFailAtt. 30.0 30.1
(0.4) (0.3) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Overall 33.5 35.7 Overall 35.5 35.9 Overall 35.5 37.2
(0.9) (1.1) (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.5)
Eciency=50% Eciency=62% Eciency=67%
Table 1.4: Utility and Eciency Outcomes: Average utility levels (with standard
deviations) attained by workers and by employers in the two attractors and overall, together
with the general eciency level, for each non-employment payment (NEP) treatment.Table 1.5: Non-Participation Rates, Work-Site Behaviors, and Welfare Outcomes---ZeroT Treatment, Generation 12
NON-PARTICIPATION RATES AND WORK SITE
BEHAVIORS
WELFARE OUTCOMES NetD Run
UnE-w Vac-e NPD-w NPD-e IntD-w IntD
-e







5 40 0 0 0 8 9 7 0 2 3 3 32.5 3.5 37.6 4.1 -0.19 -0.06
7 45 0 0 0 12 10 6 0 2 2 4 25.6 6.5 40.9 6.2 -0.36 0.02
Average 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 9.50 6.50 0.00 2.00 2.50 3.50 29.1 5.0 39.3 5.2 -0.27 -0.02






12 30 0 0 0 11 2 1 0 4 10 7 28.2 9.4 45.1 6.1 -0.29 0.13
12 50 0 0 2 3 5 6 0 0 7 6 34.2 5.9 42.0 2.3 -0.15 0.05
12 90 0 0 12 4 2 3 0 0 10 9 36.2 4.5 37.2 3.7 -0.10 -0.07
12 65 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 10 12 42.8 6.6 36.2 9.9 0.07 -0.10
Average 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.50 2.25 2.50 0.50 1.00 9.25 8.50 35.4 6.6 40.1 5.5 -0.12 -0.00








12 60 0 0 7 12 11 11 0 1 1 0 28.1 5.7 39.6 5.3 -0.28 -0.01
12 35 0 0 1 12 9 9 1 1 2 2 30.9 5.6 36.3 4.7 -0.23 -0.09
12 95 0 0 5 12 10 9 0 1 2 2 30.4 5.3 35.6 2.8 -0.24 -0.11
12 75 0 0 12 12 11 9 0 2 1 1 28.0 7.6 35.1 8.3 -0.30 -0.12
12 15 0 0 6 11 10 9 1 2 1 1 30.9 6.6 35.1 6.5 -0.23 -0.12
12 55 0 0 7 6 12 12 0 0 0 0 31.6 3.3 34.8 3.7 -0.21 -0.13
12 85 0 0 6 8 11 12 0 0 1 0 31.5 3.6 34.7 4.6 -0.21 -0.13
12 5 0 0 5 12 11 11 1 1 0 0 29.7 5.2 33.9 5.1 -0.26 -0.15
12 10 0 0 1 10 7 8 2 0 3 4 36.6 7.0 33.0 8.2 -0.09 -0.18
12 20 0 0 11 8 9 10 2 0 1 2 35.9 5.4 30.7 6.4 -0.10 -0.23
12 80 0 0 5 8 10 10 1 0 1 2 37.4 7.2 30.5 6.5 -0.07 -0.24
12 25 0 0 8 5 9 11 2 0 1 1 36.0 6.1 29.3 8.6 -0.10 -0.27
12 0 0 0 2 11 8 8 4 3 0 1 31.5 8.2 29.0 6.4 -0.21 -0.28
12 70 0 0 11 12 9 10 3 2 0 0 32.2 5.7 25.1 6.3 -0.20 -0.37
Average 0.00 0.00 6.21 9.93 9.79 9.93 1.21 0.93 1.00 1.14 32.2 5.9 33.1 6.0 -0.20 -0.17









0.00 0.00 5.15 8.85 8.25 8.10 0.95 1.05 2.80 2.85 32.5 5.9 35.1 5.8 -0.19 -0.12
Total % 0% 0% 43% 74% 69% 68% 8% 9% 23% 24%Table 1.6: Persistent Relationship Type Counts---ZeroT Treatment, Generation 12
MUTUALITY MIXED CASES (w - e) MARKET POWER NetD Run
M-IntD M-AllD M-AllC IntD-AllD IntD-AllC AllD-IntD AllD-AllC AllC-IntD AllC-AllD MPow-w MPow-e
NETWORK
PATTERNS
5 40 10 1 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 -0.19 -0.06
7 45 7 1 3 2 2 0 2 1 0 -0.36 0.02





12 30 0 0 7 2 0 0 0 1 2 -0.29 0.13
12 50 5 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 -0.15 0.05
12 90 2 0 9 0 0 0 0 1 0 -0.10 -0.07
12 65 0 0 10 0 0 0 2 0 0 0.07 -0.10






12 60 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 -0.28 -0.01
12 35 9 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.23 -0.09
12 95 9 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.24 -0.11
12 75 9 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 -0.30 -0.12
12 15 9 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 -0.23 -0.12
12 55 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.21 -0.13
12 85 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -0.21 -0.13
12 5 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.26 -0.15
12 10 7 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 -0.09 -0.18
12 20 8 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 -0.10 -0.23
12 80 10 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -0.07 -0.24
12 25 9 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 -0.10 -0.27
12 0 8 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -0.21 -0.28
12 70 9 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -0.20 -0.37







7.75 0.60 2.45 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.25 -0.19 -0.12Table 1.7: Non-Participation Rates, Work-Site Behaviors, and Welfare Outcomes---HighT Treatment, Generation 12
NON-PARTICIPATION RATES AND WORK-SITE BEHAVIORS WELFARE OUTCOMES NetD Run







0 45 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 11 11 38.6 0.6 40.7 1.0 -0.04  0.02
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 11 35.4 0.4 40.5 1.7 -0.12 0.01
1 65 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 11 35.4 0.4 40.5 1.5 -0.12 0.01
2 35 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 12 10 33.2 0.7 39.9 2.5 -0.17 -0.00
5 75 0 3 0 5 1 2 0 0 11 7 32.6 0.7 40.5 1.7 -0.19 0.01
6 40 4 2 2 12 8 10 0 0 0 0 34.0 1.8 37.2 1.9 -0.15 -0.07
Average 0.67 1.50 0.33 3.67 1.67 2.17 0.00 0.00 9.67 8.33 34.9 0.8 39.9 1.7 -0.13 -0.00






12 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 39.8 0.0 41.0 0.0 -0.01 0.03
13 10 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 39.1 2.3 40.2 1.6 -0.02 0.01
13 50 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 39.0 2.7 40.2 1.6 -0.03 0.01
13 80 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 39.0 2.7 40.2 2.1 -0.03 0.01
14 85 3 4 5 4 3 5 0 0 6 3 33.3 2.5 39.6 2.7 -0.17 -0.01
Average 1.20 1.40 1.60 0.80 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 10.20 9.60 38.1 2.0 40.2 1.6 -0.04 0.01






22 20 10 10 12 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 30.9 1.9 31.3 0.2 -0.23 -0.22
23 15 11 11 12 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 30.5 1.6 30.8 0.1 -0.24 -0.23
24 25 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
24 30 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
24 55 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
24 60 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
24 70 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
24 90 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
24 95 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 30.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 -0.25 -0.25
Average 11.67 11.67 12.00 11.67 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.2 0.4 30.3 0.0 -0.25 -0.24







5.75 6.05 5.90 6.55 0.80 1.05 0.00 0.00 5.45 4.90 33.5 0.9 35.7 0.9 -0.16 -0.11
Total % 48% 50% 49% 55% 7% 9% 0% 0% 45% 41%Table 1.8: Persistent Relationship Type Counts---HighT Treatment, Generation 12
MUTUALITY MIXED CASES (w-e) MARKET POWER NetD Run
M-IntD M-AllD M-AllC IntD-AllD IntD-AllC AllD-IntD AllD-AllC AllC-IntD AllC-AllD MPow-w MPow-e
PATTERNS
0 45 1 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.04 0.02
1 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.12 0.01
1 65 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.12 0.01
2 35 0 0 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.17 -0.00
5 75 1 0 60 0 0 0 0 1 0 -0.19        0.01
6 40 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.15 -0.07








12 5 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0.03
13 10 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.02 0.01
13 50 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.03 0.01
13 80 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.03 0.01
14 85 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 -0.17 -0.01







22 20 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.23 -0.22
23 15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.24 -0.23
24 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
24 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
24 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
24 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
24 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
24 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25
24 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25





Total Average 1.45 0.00 20.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.16 -0.11